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Peninsula Village / Two Girls ESCAPE from Acadia Village 11.12.12
« on: November 13, 2012, 04:38:34 PM »
Even MORE bad news for Joey Joe Joe and Acadia Healthcare.

A couple of teenage girls who escaped from a residential treatment center in Blount County were recaptured after the quick thinking of a man who lived nearby.

According to Sheriff James Berrong, the two girls, ages 15 and 17, were in staying at the Acadia Village Residential Center on Jones Bend Road.  Monday evening around 8:30, the girls set of a fire alarm as a distraction and took off.

After leaving the center, Berrong says the two girls broke into a nearby house, stole cash and car keys, and were attempting to steal the homeowner's vehicle when they were caught and scared off.

The girls then went to another residence nearby, knocked on the door, and told the homeowner a story about needing a ride to go see one of the girl's sick mother.

The sheriff says the homeowner invited then in and played along, then called and told authorities where the girls were.  Deputies arrived and took them back into custody around 11:40 p.m.
The teens are now in custody at the Blount Count Juvenile Detention Facility.  They are each charged with delinquent by aggravated burglary and delinquent by theft of property
of a motor vehicle over $10,000.

Peninsula Village / Homicidal PV Alumnus On The Run With Jesus...
« on: February 08, 2012, 02:18:38 PM »
I've lost count...but this has to be a program record for killer alumni.  Shit, I wonder if they still do alumni retreats? ... article=33

September 14, 2011
Suspects in Angeles double murder on the run

By: Jess Malabanan

ANGELES CITY – The two suspects in the Sept 2 cold-blood murder of ex-Ireland policeman and his Filipina live-in partner at Josefaville Subdivision are now the subject of a massive manhunt launched by authorities after they were positively identified by witnesses as responsible in the twin gunslay.

Police tagged Timothy “Tim” Kaufman, 33, native of Knoxville, Tennessee, USA, and Jesus “Jess” Santos, a suspected gun-for-hire, both occupants of an apartment along Don Juico Avenue, in Barangay Balibago, as the alleged suspects in the killing.  

Kaufman has standing court records including manufacture of methamphetamine in Knoxville seven years ago.

CL Daily sources said Kaufman worked in several bars along Fields Avenue before including those owned by businessman Richard Agnew.
This developed as city officials lauded the Angeles City Police Office (ACPO) headed by Senior Supt. Rodolfo Recomono Jr. for giving swift justice to the family of David Balmer and Elma de Guia double murder case.

Also cited is Chief Inspector Luisito Tan, Chief of the Station 4, and his men, who doubled their efforts to solve the case.

Balmer and De Guia were killed in their bed by armed men who sneaked into the house occupied by the victims and business partner Richard Agnew, a retired Irish cop, who settled along Fields Avenue and built his empire of girly bars.

Agnew was invited for questioning shortly after authorities discovered the incident but he denied knowledge of the crime.
The Irish businessman claimed he noticed the main door of his house destroyed when he arrived home from work.

But he said he “did not give much attention to it.” Believing it was his business partner that destroyed the door.

Recomono said the assassination was a well-planned  and executed by the suspects citing the recorded entry of the vehicle – white Toyota Innova (XRJ-264), and a motorcycle (2770-RD) – they used during the surveillance of the target.

Recomono said the security guards’ logbook revealed that Santos initially visited Agnew’s residence along 2-1 Quezon St.

On August 27, Recomono said Santos and a foreigner on board a KIA car with license plates XRJ-264 visited 6-6 with no name of street indicated in the logbook.

On Sept. 2, the suspects went back to Josefaville using a white Toyota Innova bearing the same license plates.
The said car was noticed by witnesses parked in front of Agnew’s residence past 3 a.m. or shortly after the killing.

When checked with the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Tan said the car was found to be registered to a certain Araceli Garcia, a resident of Barangay Sapangbato.

Garcia when confronted by police admitted she owned the car.

She told investigators that Kaufman rented the vehicle during the entire month of August.

Recomono said the Garcia immediately surrendered the car to authorities after she learned that the vehicle was used in the crime.

He said Scene Of the Crime Operatives (SOCO) from the Angeles City Crime Laboratory Office processed the car and lifted latent finger prints and marks as specimen.

The suspects are still at-large as of press time, Recomono said.

The Troubled Teen Industry / Another unlicensed hack in another hellhole.
« on: February 08, 2012, 02:39:20 AM » ... ng-doctor/

Clients Sue Unlicensed Therapist Claiming to be Doctor

Posted on Feb 7, 2012 in Blog by Reinan Law

Last week, the Law Offices of J.M. Reinan, P.C. filed suit against the Adolescent and Family Institute of Colorado (“AFIC”), its owner, Alex Panio, and its Medical Director, Dr. Edra Weiss, on behalf of Aimee and Christopher Donabedian.    

Our clients claim that AFIC and Alex Panio admitted Christopher Donabedian, then 16 years old, to AFIC’s inpatient facility, promising intensive psychiatric treatment.  Alex Panio didn’t tell the Donabedians that he was not a licensed psychologist or that his usual treatment plan included taking children off of their psychiatric medications.  The Donabedians at the time were under the false belief that Panio was a doctor because he and AFIC refer to him as such both on their internet website and in person.  The Donabedians further allege that Panio posed as a physician when discussing Christopher’s care and treatment with the Donabedian’s insurance company by doing such things as making diagnoses and telling the insurance company how he was going to change Christopher’s medication orders.  He referred to himself as a physician to the insurance company as well.

The Donabedians claim that Christopher was deprived of his necessary anti-depressant and anti-psychotic medications, which had been prescribed for him just before his admission to AFIC. They further claim that Panio went so far as to diagnose Christopher as a “sociopath,” which is no longer a recognized psychiatric diagnosis and which in no case can be applied to someone under the age of 18.  They also claim that AFIC staff told them that Christopher was “like Ted Bundy” and that staff forced Christopher to dream up and write down homicidal plans, which he did not otherwise have.

When the Donabedians attempted to remove Christopher from the mental health facility, they were thrown off of the AFIC property and ultimately had to call the police in order to secure Christopher’s discharge.  

The Donabedians have brought legal claims of deceptive trade practices; negligence; fraud; unlawful practice of medicine; breach of fiduciary duty; and civil conspiracy.

The Denver Post ran a story on the Donabedians’ case, which can be found via the following link:

As a result of this article, several other families have come forward with stories AFIC and Panio’s abuse and deception very similar to our clients’.hysician to the insurance company as well.

The Troubled Teen Industry / Leave a note for Lon
« on: January 02, 2012, 09:43:39 PM »
It isn't often you get to leave comments about Lon.  Sign up, bear witness & get sanctified.  Show him some love or lack of it.  Stomp up and down on the "fiction" button above his propaganda pieces.

Lon's passing the hat for STICC...STICC is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt charity.  Anyone aware of Mr. Reuben's compliance with laws regarding his 501(c)(3)? ... ak-the-law

From the guidelines of the Internal Revenue Service:


    1. Introduction

    Exempt purposes may generally be equated with the public good, and violations of law are the antithesis of the public good. Therefore, the conduct of such activities may be a bar to exemption. Factors that have to be considered in determining the effect of illegal activities on an organization’s qualification for exemption are the paragraph of IRC 501(c) under which the organization is exempt or is applying for exemption, and the nature and extent of the illegal activities engaged in by the organization.

    2. IRC 501(c)(3) and IRC 501(c)(4) Organizations

    A. Charity Law

    Exemption recognized under IRC 501(c)(3) is unique in that, unlike exemption under other paragraphs of IRC 501(c), it is grounded in charity law, so that denial of exemption under IRC 501(c)(3) may be based on charity law.

    (1) Substantiality Test

    Violation of constitutionally valid laws is inconsistent with exemption under IRC 501(c)(3). As a matter of trust law, one of the main sources of the general law of charity, planned activities that violate laws are not in furtherance of a charitable purpose. "A trust cannot be created for a purpose which is illegal. The purpose is illegal … if the trust tends to induce the commission of crime or if the accomplishment of the purpose is otherwise against public policy…. Where a policy is articulated in a statute making certain conduct a criminal offense, then …, a trust is illegal if its performance involves such criminal conduct, or if it tends to encourage such conduct." IV Scott on Trusts Section 377 (3d ed. 1967). Thus, all charitable trusts (and by implication all charitable organizations, regardless of their form) are subject to the requirement that their purpose may not be illegal or contrary to public policy. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Section 377, Comment c (1959). Moreover by conducting criminal activities, an organization increases the burden of government and thus thwarts a well recognized charitable goal, i.e., relief of the burdens of government.

    Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) states that an organization will not be regarded as operated "exclusively" for IRC 501(c)(3) purposes if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose. The presence of a single non-charitable purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly charitable purposes. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945). Therefore, if an organization engages in illegal acts that are a substantial part of its activities, it does not qualify for exemption under IRC 501(c)(3).

And this:

    (4) Planning Illegal Acts

    Not only is the actual conduct of illegal activities inconsistent with exemption, but the planning and sponsoring of such activities are also incompatible with charity and social welfare. Rev. Rul. 75-384 holds that an organization formed to promote world peace that planned and sponsored protest demonstrations at which members were urged to commit acts of civil disobedience did not qualify for IRC 501(c)(3) or (4) exemption. G.C.M. 36153, dated January 31, 1975, states that because planning and sponsoring illegal acts are in themselves inconsistent with charity and social welfare it is not necessary to determine whether illegal acts were, in fact, committed in connection with the resulting demonstrations or whether such a determination can be made prior to conviction of an accused. However, it is necessary to establish that the planning and sponsorship are attributable to the organization, if exemption is to be denied or revoked on this ground.

Peninsula Village / Yet Another PV Alumnus/Murderer
« on: April 21, 2011, 12:21:33 PM »
What exactly was the program at PV?  Rape, pillage, and murder?

Hawkins County police: Fannin shot grandfather, stabbed grandmother
By Jeff Bobo

Published April 20th, 2010

ROGERSVILLE — A Hawkins County teen accused of murdering his grandparents allegedly shot his retired police officer grandfather and then waited for his grandmother to come home before stabbing her to death.

Brandon Charles Fannin, 16, was charged as a juvenile Monday with two counts of first-degree murder and will appear in Hawkins County Juvenile Court on Thursday morning for a detention hearing.

He is accused in the murders of his grandparents, Clyde Hoyt Fannin, 64, and Linda Sue Fannin, 54, whose bodies were discovered by police Saturday afternoon in their home at 3210 Stanley Valley Road.

Clyde Fannin retired from the Newport News (Va.) Police Department in 2003 after 31 years as a police officer. Linda Fannin was employed in a medical office in Kingsport.

The attorney general’s office has announced its intention to prosecute the boy as an adult.

On Tuesday, the Times-News acquired the juvenile petition filed by the Hawkins County Sheriff’s Office against Brandon Fannin charging him with two counts of first-degree murder.

That petition, which was filed Monday afternoon, included new information not released by the HCSO during Monday’s press conference.

According to the petition, Linda Fannin was allegedly stabbed multiple times by Brandon Fannin. The HCSO made no mention of a stabbing during Monday’s press conference.

The petition alleges that Brandon Fannin gave a statement indicating he “had recently shot Clyde Fannin in the residence and then waited on Linda Fannin to come home and stabbed her multiple time, killing them both and attempting to clean up the scene.”

According to the petition, the two officers who initially discovered the Fannins’ bodies described looking through a window of the house and seeing “blood splatter on a wall and ceiling, and blood on a couch. Also observed was a large rug with an apparent foot protruding from underneath. Entry was made in the residence, and two bloody deceased bodies were located in the rug.”

Investigators believe the Fannins were murdered no less than 24 hours prior to their bodies being discovered — either Thursday or Friday.

Linda Fannin was employed at Cardiovascular Associates in Kingsport. When she didn’t show up for work Friday, a co-worker, Carolyn Sexton, reportedly called her home and spoke to Brandon Fannin.

“She didn’t show up for work Friday morning, and she hadn’t called anybody, which is unlike her,” Sexton said. “She’s worked here since January of 2005 and has missed work twice, and the second time she didn’t show up was because she was dead. I called the home, and he (Brandon) answered, and I asked to speak to her. ... He just told me she was very sick.”

A family member asked police to make a welfare check on the Fannin residence Saturday afternoon.

Brandon was missing when police discovered the bodies Saturday, as was the couple’s 2006 Honda Odyssey.

According to the petition, police found a letter on the kitchen table signed by Brandon Fannin stating “he had found his grandparents deceased and a thief must have killed them.”

Brandon Fannin returned home in the Honda Odyssey Monday at 3:45 a.m. and was taken into custody. A deputy had been stationed at the house since detectives left early Sunday morning.

Linda Fannin’s sister, Donna Foster, told the Times-News that Brandon had recently been suspended from Volunteer High School for carrying a knife. Foster said Brandon’s behavior problems had created tension in the home, and the Fannins were afraid of Brandon.

No motive for the killings has been released. Law enforcement officials aren’t willing to talk on the record about many details of this investigation due to it involving a juvenile.

The Times-News has spoken to reliable members of the law enforcement community close to the investigation, however, who agreed to share more details about the case on the condition of remaining anonymous.

They said Brandon Fannin has been treated for mental illness through Peninsula Hospital near Knoxville, and investigators have subpoenaed those records.

Brandon Fannin allegedly slit Linda Fannin’s throat from behind, and when she didn’t collapse immediately he stabbed her repeatedly. He reportedly described the act to investigators without emotion.

Brandon Fannin thought no one would know about the murders until Monday when Linda Fannin didn’t show up for work. When he returned home early Monday morning he was there to get supplies and wasn’t aware that there was a national BOLO (Be On the Lookout) for him and the vehicle.

He’d also reportedly gone to Indian Path Medical Center over the weekend for treatment of a minor injury. When hospital staff said it was a non-emergency and they couldn’t treat him without a parent’s permission, he fled the hospital.

Police believe that after the killings Brandon Fannin went to the Rogersville Wal-Mart, a Wal-Mart in Kingsport, and to the Fort Henry Mall, and that he slept in the van.

Brandon Fannin is being held at the Upper East Tennessee Regional Juvenile Detention Center in Johnson City pending Thursday’s detention hearing.

Peninsula Village / Andrew Klepper - 3 Strikes, Batter OUT!
« on: April 21, 2011, 04:50:45 AM »
One of PV's alumni indicates the long-term effectiveness of their program.  Klepper is better known as the baseball bat rapist admitted to PV after being tried as an adult.  PV's admission policy states they do not admit violent or sexual offenders, and Klepper was both. ... _32550.php

Bethesda man sentenced to seven years for soliciting minor

Klepper, 23, violated probation for sex assault case

by Meghan Tierney | Staff Writer

A Bethesda man, who sexually assaulted an escort eight years ago, when he was 15, was sentenced to seven years in prison for attempting to pay undercover police officers posing as a teenage girl for sex.

Andrew G. Klepper, 23, pleaded guilty to sexual solicitation of a minor, a felony, in January and was sentenced to seven years in prison with six years and six months suspended in Montgomery County Circuit Court in Rockville on Thursday.

Klepper, of the 5300 block of Westbard Avenue, used the Internet to arrange a June 11, 2009, meeting with a police officer, who was posing as a 16-year-old girl, near Gaithersburg High School. He told the officer he would pay her at least $250 for sex. After being confronted by police at the meeting site, Klepper tried to flee. He was carrying a folding knife and a small amount of cash in his car.

"You were clearly eager to do it and if that were a live human being on the other end of that line it would have been a horrendous crime," Judge Thomas L. Craven said.

Klepper, who is unemployed and not attending school, was recently diagnosed with a sexual addiction, his Rockville attorney Paul Stein said.

Stein said he hopes Klepper can get treatment for sexual addiction. "We believe that Andrew is not at this stage a danger to the community," he said.

On the day he was arrested for solicitation, Klepper was also negotiating to perform a live sex show with a prostitute; negotiating with two prostitutes to have sex with him and pose as his girlfriend at a family party; visiting mainstream and sexually explicit dating sites; making arrangements for a mail-order bride from Russia; responding to ads posted by four other prostitutes; e-mailing explicit pictures of himself and ordering pornographic movies, Assistant State's Attorney Patrick Mays, a prosecutor, said. Terms of his probation bar him from using the Internet except for school work.

"Though I've done some bad things I'm not a bad person. I'm a good person," Klepper said.

"Today I have begun to understand why I risked my freedom to be with a prostitute. Now I admit I have a sexual addiction."

Klepper was one of at least 18 men arrested last summer in a police prostitution sting. Most pleaded guilty to misdemeanor charges, Stein said; none of the others had a history of sexual violence.

Klepper was sentenced to eight years in prison last month for violating his probation by getting arrested for solicitation.

Klepper was charged as an adult with multiple felonies for holding a woman against her will and sodomizing her with the handle of a baseball bat in 2002, when he was in the tenth grade. He pleaded guilty to first-degree assault, fourth-degree sex offense and robbery with a deadly weapon as part of a deal to avoid having the case moved to the juvenile justice system. He received a 15-year suspended jail sentence and five years of probation beginning in January 2005 after returning from an out-of-state residential program for troubled youths.

Klepper was arrested in 2006 for working as a prostitute's assistant and sentenced to a year of probation. He also was charged with violating his probation in the sexual assault case.

Klepper was charged with two counts of misdemeanor theft in January 2008 for shoplifting. He was acquitted of theft but charged with violating his probation.

The Troubled Teen Industry / Peninsula Village Sold
« on: November 04, 2009, 04:00:18 PM » ... 1102.shtml

Dr. Reggie Raman
Medical Director

November 2, 2009

To Whom It May Concern:

We are writing to inform you of exciting changes occurring at Peninsula Village! Effective today, Monday, November 2nd, 2009 ownership of Peninsula Village will officially change from Parkwest Medical Center to Acadia Healthcare. The facility's legal name will also change to "The Village" at this time. Aside from this, the current operation of the clinical program and the facility itself will continue as you know it today. We would like to assure you that, under Acadia's new leadership, the program's clinicians and leadership team will continue to provide the same level of commitment to quality care that has been a hallmark here at The Village.

Headquartered in Atlanta, GA, Acadia provides psychiatric and chemical dependency services in a variety of settings including psychiatric hospitals, residential treatment centers for adolescents and children, outpatient clinics and therapeutic school-based programs. In addition to its Georgia headquarters, Acadia has facilities in Louisiana, Montana, Hawaii and Texas. We, at The Village, are excited about the opportunity to serve the needs of adolescents and their families in our care. We would like to thank you for your continued support for the important work that The Village does.

Please note that while there are no significant changes to the referral process as you know it; we are working diligently to improve the process and reduce turnaround time going forward. We hope to become your Residential Treatment Center of choice and appreciate your feedback on an ongoing basis. Please feel free to contact our Director of Business Development, Barbara Amburn, with any questions or concerns at 800-255-TEEN (8336), option 2

Let It Bleed / Guitarist Joe Pass and TTI pre-history
« on: July 01, 2009, 01:47:26 PM »
Joe Pass had a weird beginning as a recording artist.  I can't imagine...


The Melting Pot / Disease Mongering Engine
« on: May 12, 2009, 12:47:28 PM »
Create your own junk science quack disorder and turn it into a cash cow!

Disease Mongering Engine

Mine was PDAD:

Persistant Disorganized Anxiety Disorder (PDAD)

PDAD is defined as unstoppable, involuntary emotions and behaviors characterized by a striking inability to locate objects or information that occurs during episodes of extreme mental or emotional stress.

WARNING:  While the disease mongering engine is funny, the people responsible for it are NOT.  Natural News is tight with the Scientology freaks.  So...I wouldn't recommend chasing links off of it or you'll run into the lunacy of L. Ron very quickly.

The Troubled Teen Industry / Mama Liberty Says...
« on: May 11, 2009, 03:20:35 PM »
More from the other side - single parents struggling with the legal system to get their kids OUT of abusive programs. This quote from Mama Liberty:

Quote from: "Mama Liberty"
It is not possible to obtain meaningful informed consent from children who are isolated from family and friends, confined in a facility and subjected to coercive treatment.


Better listen to Mama, she knows.

Experts Warn About Dangers of Deprogramming Treatment

February 10, 2009: Specialists in childhood trauma and therapy from the Leadership Council have grave concerns about the ethics of deprogramming treatment described in a recent article published in the Globe and Mail (see: Judge Blocks Sending Teen for Deprogramming Treatment, Feb 7, 2009.  http://

We support the decision of the judge who refused to court-order deprogramming treatment (sometime called Reunification Therapy) overturning a 2008 arbitrator’s order that the 14-year-old boy be coercively treated. The controversial treatment is designed to “deprogram” children who are “alienated” from one of their parents during divorce.

Various forms of this type of “treatment” have sprung up over the last decade. The therapy usually involves confining the child in a location away from home, and isolating the child from the parent to whom the child is most attached. The attachment to the favored parent is challenged, while encouraging the child with intensive sessions to re-accept the rejected parent.

Some children have reported receiving treatment involving threats and coercion. The child may be told that he or she may not return home until they have accepted a more favorable view of the denigrated parent. One child the LC has interviewed described recurrent nightmares of the de-programming episodes that were used on him. In addition, there have been several lawsuits related to this type of approach. (see:

This so-called “therapy” is reminiscent of the kind of brainwashing techniques used in prison camps where deprivation and isolation are used to coerce false confessions and to force ideological changes in captives. While these techniques can produce changes in belief and in behavior, we are concerned that these techniques are harmful to the mental health of children.

We are also concerned that deprogramming treatments may violate basic ethical principles that guide practice. According to the American Psychological Association’s ethical standards, the goals of psychologists are the welfare and protection of individuals. We question whether deprogramming treatment protects the welfare of the children involved. We have listed some of our concerns at the end of this release. (see: Concerns)

Deprogramming treatment raises philosophical and legal questions which remain unresolved in our approach to children. Are children simply the property of adults whose legal interests can control what children think and believe? In what sense does the child’s intellectual and emotional freedom have precedence over these legal interests? While these complex issues are not yet resolved, the controversial nature of this deprogramming treatment would argue for caution in safeguarding the mental health of children while we wrestle with these complex questions.

One of the concrete dangers of this type of therapy is that it has been used to force children into reunification with adults that have committed violent crimes against them, thus putting the children at risk of further victimization.

The Leadership Council has spoken with several victims of this type of therapy who were traumatized by the treatment. One young man says he continues to have flashbacks from his forced isolation from his mother and from continually being confronted by a therapist who told him his beliefs were wrong. After reunification with the parent he had been coerced to accept (in this case his father), he discovered that this parent was indeed abusive, his previous beliefs had been correct, and he felt betrayed and maltreated by the courts that had ordered this therapy. This case clearly illustrates that therapy that stems from the agenda of an interested legal party may be detrimental to the autonomy and welfare of the child for whom it is ordered.

Sometimes reunification therapy does not involve confinement and separation from the primary parent, but involves forced therapy sessions with a rejected parent. Many of the same ethical questions apply to this type of therapy as well, as the child is often forced to attend these sessions against his/her will. If the child is being forced to reunify with a parent he has clearly stated was abusive to him or her, the child may react with increased symptoms, suicidal ideation, or even suicide attempts.

Does this mean that children shouldn’t receive therapy in situations where a child is estranged from one of their parents? No.

There are respectful and accepted techniques available that do not involve coercion or confinement that can help children in these situations. For example, one technique involves listening to children and helping them sort through their often conflicted feelings about their parents. This form of therapy, when done with a neutral therapist who is committed to safeguarding the interests of the child, is a more humane and appropriate approach. In addition, this is the approach that is most likely to be effective.

For all of these reasons, the LC strongly supports the judge’s decision described in the Globe and Mail article, and advises parents seeking remedies for children from whom they are estranged to seek less coercive and more ethical forms of treatment. Also, courts should resist ordering children into any treatment that is coercive and experimental. Instead, any court-ordered treatment should abide by APA ethical guidelines and be based on empirical evidence.

Children have a right to their thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and opinions. The legal interests of warring adults should not be the agenda that drives the mental health approach used for vulnerable children.
Our Concerns Regarding “Deprogramming” Therapy

1. Being Confined and Isolated from Family and Friends in an unfamiliar Setting May be a Traumatic Experience for Children Leading Them to Feel Trapped, Helpless, and Powerless.

Isolating a child from everyone they are familiar with and attempting to force a new view of their parents, especially by strangers who know little about the child’s experiences with their parents can be traumatic. This is of particular concern as many children being exposed to these techniques have reported a history of abuse from the very individuals they are being forced to reunify with.

One girl subjected to this treatment was placed in a treatment facility by her father. The therapists adopted the father’’s viewpoint and the child was repeatedly told that her father who had abused her on a numerous occasions, hadn’t. She finally parroted what she was told to say in order to get out the facility where she was being held. When returned to her father, she ran away from home and lived on the streets until she was able to get a judge to listen to listen to her. She was finally allowed to return to her mother after a hearing in which the young teen’s concerns were finally listened to.

Coercive and punitive “therapies” are especially inappropriate when used on children who have already been traumatized. These children may find this kind of setting a “trigger” for further post-traumatic reactions. Forced reunification against a child’s will and without taking into consideration the child’s point of view and emotional well-being, can be expected to reinforce a sense of helplessness and powerlessness in an already vulnerable child. Such “treatment” can be expected to do more harm than good, and could potentially cause lasting emotional harm.

2. According to APA Ethical Standards, Psychologists Respect and Protect Civil and Human Rights (Preamble to the APA Ethical Guidelines)

The right to one’s belief system is considered the most basic of human rights. The confinement of a child who has committed no wrong doing away from parents and friends in unfamiliar surroundings in order to force them to adopt a new belief system may violate a child’s basic civil rights.

3. According to APA Ethical Principles, Individuals have a Basic Right to Self-Determination (Principle E: Respect for People’s Rights and Dignity)

Being forced to change one’s belief system may violate the principle of self-determination.

4. According to APA Ethical Principles, Psychologists Avoid Multiple Relationships to Avoid Conflicts of Interest (APA Ethics code: 3.05)

According to ethical standards set forth by the APA, “a psychologist refrains from entering into a multiple relationship if the multiple relationship could reasonably be expected to impair the psychologist’s objectivity, competence, or effectiveness in performing his or her functions as a psychologist, or otherwise risks exploitation or harm to the person with whom the professional relationship exists.”

A psychologist who has contracted with a parent to force a child against his will into a relationship is engaged in a dual relationship. One with the contracting parent and one with the client-child. The child’s goals and interests may be in direct conflict to those of the parent that has engaged the therapist. This dual role presents an unavoidable conflict that would keep the child’s feelings, beliefs, and desires from being central during treatment.

5. According to APA Ethical Principles, Psychologists Must Engage in Therapeutic Services Only After Obtaining Informed Consent – Even when a Client is Not Legally Capable of Giving Informed Consent, The Psycologist Still Must Explain the Procedures, Consider the Individual’s Preferences and Gain Their Assent Prior to Treatment. (APA Ethics code: 3.10).

According to ethical standards set forth by the APA, “For persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent, psychologists nevertheless (1) provide an appropriate explanation, (2) seek the individual’s assent, (3) consider such persons’ preferences and best interests..”

It is not possible to obtain meaningful informed consent from children who are isolated from family and friends, confined in a facility and subjected to coercive treatment.

Posted by MamaLiberty at 12:48 PM

The Troubled Teen Industry / Peninsula says staff reduction in works
« on: March 31, 2009, 02:27:53 PM » ... 2166189843#db=pwh&AN=2W62W62166189843

Peninsula says staff reduction in works: Mental-health provider says reimbursement cuts lessen demand


Carly Harrington

Mar. 19--Mental-health provider Peninsula is in the process of reducing its staff to accommodate health care reimbursement cuts that have resulted in less demand for services.

"We are seeing an impact, and we may have to adjust accordingly," said Max Shell, senior vice president of marketing and community relations for Covenant Health, which owns and operates Peninsula.

The state budget cuts have reduced reimbursement rates to hospitals, particularly for behavioral health, which always has been a fraction of other kinds of health care, Shell said.

None of Covenant Health's other facilities is being impacted, he added. Covenant Health is the largest hospital operator in the Knoxville area.

"This just relates to behavioral for us," he said.

While one source puts the number of affected Peninsula employees as high as 50-60, Shell said the figure is still undetermined.

"We've notified some employees that we may have to flex down. Fortunately, we're a large system with a number of openings. To the extent that occurs, we'll be able to match people accordingly," Shell said.

Peninsula, which began in 1996, has 12 locations in five counties including a 155-bed in-patient hospital, a residential treatment facility and several outpatient centers.

Business writer Carly Harrington may be reached at 865-342-6317.

To see more of The Knoxville News-Sentinel or to subscribe to the newspaper, go to Copyright (c) 2009, The Knoxville News-Sentinel, Tenn. Distributed by McClatchy-Tribune Information Services. For reprints, email [email protected], call 800-374-7985 or 847-635-6550, send a fax to 847-635-6968, or write to The Permissions Group Inc., 1247 Milwaukee Ave., Suite 303, Glenview, IL 60025, USA.
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Source: Knoxville News-Sentinel, The (TN), Mar 19, 2009
Item: 2W62W62166189843

Peninsula Village / Lay It On Them, Jeffrey.
« on: March 25, 2009, 03:30:18 PM »
LOL.  Mr. Weinberg enters the lion's den with an Uzi. He points out the weird logic of celebrating a "degrading atmosphere". ... 9651253224

Quote from: "Jeffrey Harris Weinberg Ccna"
hey sid and grayson, you guys are ridiculous - sid, how can you say that i'm a failure; you realize that i've been complimented by many my age that i happen to perform exceptionally well? of course not you typical brainwashed pv "alumni" bastard. grayson really isn't even worth bothering with because he's pretty unintelligent

also i don't know if anyone ever notices but whenever i come here to write something i always remove myself off the group members list. you know why? it's because pv is an embarrassment - most of you guys who have nothing else but the big book/aa/pv in your lives probably don't care, but to me, i don't want people knowing that i ever was in such a degrading atmosphere

as far as the lawsuit thing is concerned, I honestly have been busy as hell lately as i am going for my next certification in my IT field and that combined with work makes life a bit busy

Peninsula Village / Peninsula's Adult Program - a horror story.
« on: March 02, 2009, 02:16:53 AM »
This was a malpractice action against Peninsula's adult facility for negligent patient care.  Larry Rich was in "a special care unit, locked and monitored, where suicidal patients were constantly observed", an adult version of STU.  Kids kill themselves in programs and the negligent facility and staff walk or receive meager punishments.  

BUT - Larry Rich was an how differently his RTC death was treated than the deaths of teens in programs.  Rich's widow won her malpractice suit, and the decision was upheld by Judge Inman in the Court of Appeals when Peninsula appealed, bitching about how the facility was described by plaintiff's counsel and the award of compensatory damages of $650,000.00 was decried as "excessive".  Based on Larry Rich's projected earnings if he had lived to 65 and discounting salary increases (he was 39 when he passed), the award of $650,000.00 is less than Rich's projected earnings.  

How does Peninsula deal with investigations of their negligence?  See below.  They destroy all evidence, and defiantly.  The wife of the majority stockholder of Peninsula was the nursing director who disposed of the damning evidence, and there's no mention of Nurse Greer being charged with obstruction or destroying evidence.
Rich was wearing street clothes and the nurse discovered three tablets beside him on the bed. A note was discovered on a table beside the bed asking that the taped message in the recorder on the table be delivered to Rich's attorney. Rich was transferred by ambulance to Blount Memorial Hospital emergency room at approximately 8:40 A.M. He died there that afternoon at approximately 1:50 P.M. of cardiac arrest secondary to an Amitriptyline overdose.

Peninsula did not report the incident and refused to allow the police to investigate when they arrived, following a report by Blount Memorial Hospital. Michelle Painter was in charge of the hospital at that time and advised the officers to obtain a search warrant, but later on the police were allowed to investigate under protest. At that time, the room had been "straightened up" and the suicide note and other items had been removed and locked in the nurses' station.

A room checklist would indicate the identity of the individuals who allegedly checked Rich hourly. This document was subsequently destroyed and the decision to do so was made by Nancy Greer who was Director of Nursing and was also the spouse of the defendant's (Peninsula's) majority stockholder. A nurse's worksheet is a record to which any of the hospital personnel can contribute which would show information about the patient gathered throughout a 24 hour period. This document also came to Nancy Greer and was destroyed. The tape recorded instructions from the day shift to the night shift on June 22nd were obliterated the following day after Rich had died but before Peninsula had been advised of his death.



April 6, 1990


From the Law Court, Blount County.

Rehearing Denied July 23, 1990

Earl R. Layman, John T. O'Connor, James E. Wagner, Knoxville, for the Appellee

Hogin, London and Montgomery, Knoxville, for the Appellant

William H. Inman, Special Judge, Clifford E. Sanders, P.j. (e.s.), Houston M. Goddard, J., Concur.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Inman


This is a hospital malpractice action wherein the appellant was onerated with substantial compensatory and punitive damages for the wrongful death of Larry M. Rich whom the jury found to have died as a result of negligent patient care.

At the time of his death in June 1985, Larry Rich was thirty-nine years old and had been employed for fifteen years in the Law Department of Southern Railroad Company as an investigator. His health history included periods of panic attacks occurring since adolescence, previous psychotherapy, and a psychiatric hospitalization several years previously. He also had a history of back problems with laminectomy surgery, two fusion surgeries, and had a 30% disability from these back problems. In May 1985, believing that he was having a heart attack he was hospitalized in the coronary care unit of University of Tennessee Hospital, where his chest pain was determined to be produced by anxiety and re flux rather than a cardiac problem. He was referred to Peninsula Psychiatric Hospital as a voluntary patient on June 4, 1985, by the psychotherapist he had been seeing for some years, Dr. Bob Wahler. His second marriage had ended in divorce in October 1984 and his emotional problems were exacerbated by his inability to accept the divorce. Because his religious ethic was strong he believed that spiritually he was still married to his second wife. His first marriage had ended in divorce in 1981 and his daughter by that marriage, aged 10, was his next of kin on whose behalf this suit was filed.

Peninsula maintained a special care unit, locked and monitored, where suicidal patients were constantly observed. It conceded its obligation to prevent a patient's suicide and to further that end obtained written permission from the patient to search his person.

Rich's condition was diagnosed as "dysthemic disorder, panic disorder versus generalized anxiety disorder, and dependent character disorder." Treatment by the hospital staff was supplemented by continued outpatient treatment by Dr. Wahler. The treatment goals for Rich while hospitalized were to decrease his panic attacks, decrease his obsessive and compulsive traits, alleviate the separation process from his second ex-wife, monitor his chemical dependency on pain medication resulting from his back problems, and decrease his manipulation of staff and therapists. Rich had at times expressed suicidal ideations, but said that his deep religious convictions precluded suicide and he had never made any attempt at suicide. While hospitalized he received various medications, including medication for a thyroid condition, for headache pain, and for depression. Neither his treating physicians nor anyone at Peninsula ever prescribed Amitriptyline for Rich.

Rich was a patient in the adult psychiatric section of the hospital, which is a "care level 2" status in which staff conduct hourly checks of the patients. During the course of his hospitalization he was twice placed in an increased level of care, the special care unit. On the first occasion, lasting from the evening of June 13 until the morning of June 17, he had become tearful and anxious and had suicidal thoughts after telephoning his ex-wife on their wedding anniversary. The second occasion, a 45-minute period on June 20, occurred when he had a panic attack. He left the hospital on four occasions, twice when he went to his outpatient therapist by hospital-provided transportation on June 18 and June 20, and twice for therapeutic assignments approved by his psychiatrist when he drove his own automobile to see his therapist on June 10 and to get a haircut, visit his mother and check his mail on June 22.

When Rich returned to Peninsula on June 22 at 2:30 P.M. he was checked in by Silvers, a mental health associate who checked the contents of the brown paper bag Rich brought in, asked him for his car keys and any "sharps", medications or other contraband. Rich was quiet, stated he felt nervous on therapeutic assignment, but that it had gone well and that his medications helped his anxiety. He asked and received permission to return to his car. Silvers testified that he did not remember where the paper bag was at that time, but no search was conducted. This proved to be a critical omission.

When called by intercom for his 6:00 P.M. medications, he replied "okay" but did not go for them, and except for this one-word response Rich was never again observed in a conscious condition.

Patricia Lowe (first ex-wife) received two calls from Rich on the afternoon of the 22nd, one shortly after his return to the hospital. She reported that he was terribly upset as a result of his encounter with Sylvia (second ex-wife) to the extent that his voice was trembly and he was hard to understand. Patricia called Peninsula and reported that she was very worried because Rich was so upset and requested that Rich be requested to call her and when he did not, she again called and was told by Peninsula personnel that, "we don't give them their messages; . . . its their responsibility to come up here and get them".

When Rich did not come for his medication at 10:00 he was checked by Imogene Woodfin. She did not observe the suicide note and tape recorder which was discovered the next morning, nor did she observe the three Amitriptyline pills on the bed beside him. She testified that she looked closely enough to see that his chest was rising and falling but she failed to observe that he was in street clothes and shoes. Nurse Woodfin attempted to arouse Rich but was unsuccessful and she reported to the Charge Nurse, Michelle Painter, that she was unable to awaken him. Ms. Painter told Nurse Woodfin that she (Ms. Painter) would check on Rich but she failed to do so.

Thereafter the night shift charge nurse came on duty, was informed that Rich had a difficult therapeutic assignment, had tried to see his ex-wife, and had been anxious and upset, had been given verbal support by the staff, had made a phone call, had gone to bed in the mid-afternoon and had not taken his 6:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M. medications. Charting done at 6:00 A.M. the next morning showed that at hourly checks Rich appeared to be asleep. At approximately 8:00 A.M. when the charge nurse went to Rich's room to give him morning medication, his attempts to arouse Rich were unsuccessful. Rich was wearing street clothes and the nurse discovered three tablets beside him on the bed. A note was discovered on a table beside the bed asking that the taped message in the recorder on the table be delivered to Rich's attorney. Rich was transferred by ambulance to Blount Memorial Hospital emergency room at approximately 8:40 A.M. He died there that afternoon at approximately 1:50 P.M. of cardiac arrest secondary to an Amitriptyline overdose.

Peninsula did not report the incident and refused to allow the police to investigate when they arrived, following a report by Blount Memorial Hospital. Michelle Painter was in charge of the hospital at that time and advised the officers to obtain a search warrant, but later on the police were allowed to investigate under protest. At that time, the room had been "straightened up" and the suicide note and other items had been removed and locked in the nurses' station.

A room checklist would indicate the identity of the individuals who allegedly checked Rich hourly. This document was subsequently destroyed and the decision to do so was made by Nancy Greer who was Director of Nursing and was also the spouse of the defendant's majority stockholder. A nurse's worksheet is a record to which any of the hospital personnel can contribute which would show information about the patient gathered throughout a 24 hour period. This document also came to Nancy Greer and was destroyed. The tape recorded instructions from the day shift to the night shift on June 22nd were obliterated the following day after Rich had died but before Peninsula had been advised of his death.


At the close of all the evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict on grounds that: 1) the plaintiff had introduced no evidence to establish that the alleged negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages and 2) a wrongful death action was barred under the uncontroverted evidence. These grounds were again asserted by the defendant in its motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial and again overruled.

The case against the defendant is based on acts and omissions over the period from Saturday, June 22, 1985 until Sunday morning, June 23, when Rich's distressed condition was discovered. The plaintiff asserted two theories of recovery against defendant: the first for deviations from required care of deceased which failed to effect a prevention of his ingestion of the drug, and the second for deviations from the required care of deceased in failing to subsequently discover that he had overdosed in time to save him from the fatal effects of the drug. The defendant argues that its directed verdict motions should have been granted as to both of these theories, because the suicide was a deliberate act, and because no evidence of proximate cause was presented to show that any negligence of defendant affected the outcome. The defendant argues that a verdict could not be predicated on the second theory because no evidence of proximate cause was presented to show that any negligence of the defendant was a cause of Rich's death. In addition to the issue of whether a judgment N.O.V. should have been entered, the appellant presents for our review the further issues:

1. Whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff to read into proof portions of the discovery depositions of Michelle Painter and Will Barton on a holding that they were managing agents of the defendant.

2. Whether defendant is entitled to a new trial on grounds of improper conduct of plaintiff's counsel.

3. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

4. Whether the trial court erred in refusing defendant's requested jury instructions on the issue of punitive damages.

5. Whether the damage verdicts were so excessive as to require a remittitur.


Our standard of review is prescribed by Rule 13(d), Rules of Appellate Procedure. Findings of fact by a jury in a civil action shall be set aside only if there is no material evidence to support the verdict. A motion for a directed verdict may be granted only if no material evidence exists from which a jury could find for the party against whom the motion is made, and courts are required to look to all the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, to discard all countervailing evidence, to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence for the plaintiff and to allow all reasonable inferences from it in favor of the plaintiff. Walker v. Associates Com. Corp., 673 S.W.2d 517 (Ct. App. 1983); Royal v. Days Inns of America, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1985).

There was evidence which the jury was at liberty to accredit that Rich ingested the drug on the afternoon of June 22, and that he thereafter lay on his bed, in street clothes and shoes, until the following morning. The jury could have concluded that the pills found in his bed on the morning of June 23, and the tape recorder with the dictated suicide note, were in place throughout the night, which might reasonably have been detected had the hospital performed its represented duty. The appellant concedes there was evidence that it deviated from an acceptable standard of care by: (1) failing to check Rich's pockets on his return from the therapeutic visitation; (2) failing to search his person and the paper sack on his return from the car; (3) and failing to keep an informed chart history.

Superimposed upon these acts is evidence from which a jury might further conclude that the defendant's employees were negligent by (4) failing to heed the significance of, and consequently of raising an alarm about, the wearing of shoes and street clothes while abed, or failing to exercise due care to observe the manner of his dress; (5) failing to assess the extent of Rich's desperation upon his return from a therapeutic assignment; (6) the failure of the charge nurse to read the chart, and her lack of information, otherwise available, concerning the renewal of Rich's anguish by contact with Sylvia; (7) failing to monitor Rich more closely after his contact with Sylvia, since his suicidal tendencies were then more pronounced, as known to the appellant, and (8) failure of the charge nurse to apprise herself that Rich had been a patient in Category 1 care as a suicide risk. While the appellant concedes that it failed to conduct an adequate search when Rich returned from his therapeutic assignment, it insists that no evidence was presented to establish that an adequate search would have discovered the drugs. This argument essentially begs the question; the defendant had the duty - the contractual duty - to search Rich and discover the very pills which destroyed him, and the point cannot be successfully rebutted by the claim that the plaintiff failed to prove that any search would have been successful. The jury was clearly entitled to infer from the failure to search that had a search been conducted under the circumstances Rich presented that the destructive pills would have been discovered.

The appellant argues, see: German v. Nichopoulas, 577 S.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1978) that positive proof of negligence does not constitute proof of causation, and that this record is devoid of any proof of causation, a necessary element to be proved. As we have observed, there was evidence presented from which the jury might lawfully conclude that the negligence of the appellant enabled Rich to transport the drugs; and the appellee, pursuing the causal relationship, adduced evidence that in light of his severe disturbance Rich might reasonably have been expected to ingest them. We think the inadequate search was directly and causally related to Rich's death by his own hand. Again, the argument of the appellant that no evidence was presented that a conformed and thorough search would have found the drug essentially begs the question, because this argument, if valid, takes from the jury its prerogative to make reasonable inferences from established facts.

The appellant further argues in this vein that no medical evidence was presented of the probable time of the overdose or the time at which the effects of the overdose became irreversible. We note the testimony of a medical expert, Dr. Layman, "that earlier intervention would have saved him". Another expert testified that the effects of the drug were consistent with Rich's condition as early as 10:00 P.M., and that the sooner therapy is administered the better the results. As held in Johnson v. Ely, 205 S.W.2d 759 (Ct App. 1947)

"It was for the jury to weigh the probabilities in the light of all the proof and determine the weight of the inferences to be reasonably drawn from the circumstances relied upon by plaintiff in the light of the possibilities or probabilities appearing from the proof offered by defendant. Because there were possibilities or even probabilities opposed to the circumstantial evidence in the case did not overcome as a matter of law the force of the circumstantial evidence, and in such a case a verdict based on the whole evidence would not be the product of speculation and conjecture. Law v. Louisville & H.R. Co., 179 Tenn. 687, 170 S.W.2d 360."

Causation may be established by proof of facts and circumstances which demonstrates a reasonable probability that the negligence of the appellant was the proximate cause of the death of Rich. In Crowe v. Prevost, 374 S.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1963) the Court stated

"The rule that a verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture as to cause does not necessarily require that the plaintiff prove causation by direct and positive evidence, which excludes every other possible hypothesis as to the cause of the injuries, it generally being held that if a fair preponderance of the evidence discloses facts and circumstances proving a reasonable probability that the defendant's negligence or want of skill was the proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff has supported his burden of proof sufficiently to justify a verdict in his behalf."

The case of Truan v. Smith, 578 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1979), is of precedential value, because of the expert evidence that the sooner therapy is administered the better the results, and that earlier intervention would have saved Rich. In Truan, Dr. Truan failed to diagnose a breast cancer. The proof showed that if he had diagnosed and informed the patient that she might have a cancer, she could have returned for a recheck and if so the patient's chances of either remission or recovery would have been materially increased. In affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Court, said,

"Finally, there was medical testimony that metastasis had not occurred on May 6, 1974, and that, had the cancer been treated before that date, Mrs. Smith's chances of either remission or recovery would have materially increased. From these facts, we think the jury reasonably could conclude that, in failing to detect the breast mass when he had an opportunity to do so on both November 12, 1973, and March 25, 1974, and in failing to act on the patient's complaints on March 25, 1974, Dr. Truan did not exercise that degree of care and diligence required of him in providing medical care to Mrs. Smith, and that this lapse either materially increased the changes of or accelerated Mrs. Smith's death."

Appellant insists that there is no evidence in this record from which the jury could conclude that Rich's death would not have occurred save for the negligent acts ascribed to it, because no witness testified that had "the defendant been free of negligence, Rich would not have ingested the pills." This argument is bottomed squarely on a Conclusion; and even the appellant conceded that the purpose of Rich's hospitalization was to enable him to cope with losing Sylvia; i.e., prevent his suicide. The appellant failed to guard against the very acts which occasioned the contractual hospitalization in the first instance, and this failure is equatable to causation and proximate cause.

The appellant insists that the voluntary and deliberate act of suicide, when considered in the light of the asserted lack of evidence of proximate cause, or causation, bars a recovery, and refers us to Weather v. Pilkington, 754 S.W.2d 75, (Ct. App. 1988) in support of its argument. Weathers holds that if a suicidal person understands the nature of his act and has a wilful purpose to accomplish it, he has no cause of action for his own deliberate act. In that case, a general practitioner had refused to commit the deceased despite several suicide threats and attempts. The obvious argument was that the family physician should have been forewarned and thus committed him to safe-keeping. The appellee urges us that Weathers is not in point, because the facts were far different from the case at bar. Standard of care in a psychiatric hospital was not involved. On the contrary, the departure from the standard of care alleged was that Dr. Pilkinton failed to admit the decedent, Michael Weathers, to a psychiatric unit. The trial Judge directed a verdict in favor of Dr. Pilkinton on the grounds that Weathers' intentional act in shooting himself was an intervening cause and even if Dr. Pilkinton were guilty of proximate negligence, he was insulated from liability.

In the present case, the appellant assumed the responsibility to protect the deceased against suicide as testified to by Peninsula's physician, Dr. Lane Cook. The purpose of Rich's hospitalization at Peninsula was because of his inability to cope with losing Sylvia and Peninsula maintained a special care unit which was locked and monitored for the purpose of discharging its duty to suicidal patients. It obtained a written contract from its patient, giving it the right to search and confiscate.

The duty of a psychiatric hospital to guard against a suicide is discussed in the case of Stokes v. Leung, 651 S.W.2d 704 (Tenn. App. 1982). Stokes sued on behalf of his ward, Mary Hall, who had jumped from an unsecured room in the hospital. She sued the treating physician, Dr. Leung, and the hospital, but took a non-suit as to hospital on the morning of trial. The Court said with reference to the duty of a psychiatric hospital to prevent a patient from harming himself:

"We hold that when a hospital elects to accept a patient with psychiatric disorders and with orders that 'suicide precautions' be taken, the prime responsibility to afford reasonably safe facilities and reasonable attendance to the patient's needs to prevent self injury lies with the hospital and not the physician. The physician is not in constant attendance. The hospital is supposed to be. If a doctor prescribes certain medication and the hospital nurse administers another, is the doctor liable for that error? We know of no case in this state that so holds. What we have said on this point is, as we see it, nothing more than a restatement of the rule enunciated in O'Quin vs. Baptist Memorial Hospital, (1947 Tenn.) 184 Tenn. 570, 201 S.W.2d 694, and reiterated in Spivey vs. St. Thomas Hospital, (1947 M.S.) 31 Tenn. App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450 that:

'The general rule is that a hospital is required to exercise such reasonable care toward a patient as his known condition may require and the extent and character of this care depends upon the circumstances of each case.'"

We think that when the intervening act is itself the foreseeable harm that shapes a defendant's duty, the defendant who fails to guard against the act will not be relieved from liability when the act occurs . . . W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 44, at 303 (5th ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 448, 449 (1964). This is the case even when the intervening act is committed by the plaintiff himself. 4 F. Harper, F. James & O. Gray, The Law of Torts, § 20.5, at 158 (2d ed. 1986).

We hold that the motion for a directed verdict was properly denied.


The trial court allowed the plaintiff to read to the jury portions of the discovery depositions of Painter and Barton, charge nurses, upon the theory that they were managing agents within the ambit of Rules 32.01 and 43.02, Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant objected on the ground that these witnesses did not meet the definition of managing agents. The appellee argues that the objection to the testimony of these witnesses on the ground they were not managing agents at the time of the taking of their depositions is raised for the first time on appeal since the objection at trial was offered solely on the ground they were not managing agents. We see no need to draw this issue so fine, because the jury-out testimony of Barton established that he and Painter, within the purview of Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 521 S.W.2d 558, (Tenn. 1975), were managing agents. In Hughes, a managing agent is defined as any person who:

1. Acts with superior authority and is invested with general powers to exercise his judgment and discretion in dealing with his principal's affairs (as distinguished from a common employee, who does only what he is told to do; has no discretion about what he can or cannot do; and is responsible to an immediate superior who has control over his acts);

2. Can be depended upon to carry out his principal's directions to give testimony at the demand of a party engaged in litigation with his principal; and

3. Can be expected to identify himself with the interests of his principal rather than those of the other party.

In addition, the Court set out six factors to be used in determining whether or not an employee is a managing agent. Those factors, listed on page 563:

a. the possibility of hostile or adverse interest.

b. the loyalty of the individual concerned.

c. the extent of his authority.

d. the extent to which his actions are discretionary.

e. the precise nature of his duties.

f. the availability of any other person of higher title or rank to testify.

The Court said, "None of these factors is controlling, but each should be considered."

In the jury-out hearing, Mr. Barton acknowledged that a Charge Nurse has no direct supervisor and that he was "responsible for making any decision about whatever went on" and that there was no one present to overrule his decisions.

Michelle Painter testified that she was the Charge Nurse at the hospital on weekends, working from 8:00 A.M. to Midnight on Saturday and Sunday. When questioned concerning her authority, she said:

Question: During that period of time, were you in charge, were you the boss at the hospital over that period of time?

Answer: Yes, I was. They had a nurse who was responsible for the adult chemical dependency unit and I was a consultant person on that unit. The rest of the hospital, yes. I would expect -- my understanding was I was over all. In the issues of hospital management, I was the boss.

We agree with the trial Judge that Painter and Barton were managing agents within the Rule. This issue is without merit.


The appellant complains of the conduct of counsel for the appellee in repeatedly referencing it as a for-profit corporation, and stressing the relative economic positions of the parties. These remarks were not objected to, and hence the issue is not preserved on appeal. Morgan v. Duffy, 30 SW 735 (1895); Lee v. Lee, 719 S.W.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1986). Comments of counsel during closing arguments are preserved in the record, and there can be little doubt of their departure from propriety. But as held in the early case of East Tenn., Virginia and Georgia Ry. Co. v. Gurley, 80 Tenn. 46 (1883) much must be left to the good sense of the jury, and the remarks, as likely as not, might well have been counterproductive. This issue is without merit.


The appellant says that the issue of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury. In the case of Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, (Tenn. 1975), our Supreme Court held

Punitive damages are allowed under Tennessee law and are given in excess of compensatory damages and in addition thereto. They are awarded in cases involving fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression, or where a wrongful act is done with bad motive or so recklessly as to imply a disregard of social obligation, or where there is such willful misconduct or entire want of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.

The appellee argues that two circumstances justify the imposition of punitive damages: (1) the failure of the hospital staff to search Rich after he was allowed to return to his automobile, and (2) failing to provide medical attention after Rich could not be awakened at 10:00 P.M.

We are of the opinion that these circumstances are wholly insufficient to justify punitive damages. While the failure to awaken Rich, standing alone and without regard to the attendant circumstances, might logically be described as a disregard of duty, see: Suzore v. Rutherford, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1952), we cannot ascribe a conscious indifference or wanton spirit to acts that cannot be elevated to a greater degree of wrongdoing than ordinary negligence. This issue has merit, and the judgment will accordingly be modified to disallow punitive damages.


Appellant insists that the award of compensatory damages of $650,000.00 is excessive and should be reduced.

Rich was 39 years old, a college graduate and a professional claims agent for the Southern Railway Company. His salary in 1984 was $34,767.00. His statutory worklife expectancy was 26 years. With no allowance for salary increases he could reasonably have expected to earn mare than the amount of the award, assuming his retirement at age 65. As observed by the appellee, the award is less than projected lost wages. The damages recoverable are the pecuniary value of Rich's life, T.C.A. 20-5-113, determined b evidence of life expectancy, his age and condition of health, capacity for labor and earning money, and life style. Bellamy v. Saddler, 640 S.W.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1982). We cannot find that the evidence does not support the award, and this issue is without merit.

The judgment, as modified, is affirmed, costs are assessed two-thirds to appellant and one-third to the appellee.

Open Free for All / Saggin' Isn't A Crime.
« on: March 01, 2009, 12:59:37 AM »
Chad, Hermitage Manor and PV's abuses don't get any legislative consideration in TN.  The good ol' boys like places that store godless little teenage heathens, queers and junkies. Wilfull display of gluteal cleavage and/or boxer shorts is an abomination unto Bible-Belt True Christians and must be smited. Or smote.

First offense:  $200 and 40 hours community service work.

Fourth offense:  $1,000 and 160 hours of community service work.

Did Cheryl Sudweeks or Randall Hinton pull  as much in fines and community service hours?

Legislative Report Tennessee Commission on Children and Youth February 27, 2009


By Ford, O.

AN ACT to amend Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 39
and Title 49, relative to criminal offenses.

SECTION 1. Tennessee Code Annotated, Title 39, Chapter 17, Part 9, is amended by
adding the following language as a new section:
§ 39-17-9__.

(a) It is an offense for any person to knowingly wear pants below the
person's waistline, in a public place, in a manner that exposes the person's
underwear or bare buttocks.

(b) As used in subsection (a):

(1) “Public place” means any location frequented by the public, or
where the public is present or likely to be present, or where a person may
reasonably be expected to be observed by members of the public. “Public
place” includes, but is not limited to, streets, sidewalks, parks, beaches,
business and commercial establishments, whether for profit or not-forprofit
and whether open to the public at large or where entrance is limited
by a cover charge or membership requirement, bottle clubs, hotels,
motels, restaurants, night clubs, country clubs, cabarets and meeting
facilities utilized by any religious, social, fraternal or similar organizations;
(2) "Underwear" means an article of personal wear that is worn
between the skin and an outer layer of clothing. "Underwear" includes,
but is not limited to, boxer shorts and thongs.
- 2 - 00388005

(1) A violation of subsection (a) is a Class C misdemeanor and
shall be punished as follows:

(A) A first offense is punishable only by a fine of two
hundred dollars ($200) and forty (40) hours of community service
work, which fine or penalty shall not be suspended or waived;

(B) A second offense is punishable only by a fine of five
hundred dollars ($500) and eighty (80) hours of community
service work, which fine or penalty shall not be suspended or

(C) A third offense is punishable only by a fine of seven
hundred and fifty dollars ($750) and one hundred and twenty (120)
hours of community service work, which fine or penalty shall not
be suspended or waived; and

(D) A fourth or subsequent offense is punishable only by a
fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) and one hundred and sixty
(160) hours of community service work, which fine or penalty shall
not be suspended or waived.

(2) Any community service to which a person is sentenced for a
violation of this section shall be scheduled around the offender's work and
school schedule.

(d) There is created a special account in the state treasury to be known
as the "Extracurricular Activities Enhancement Fund", hereinafter referred to as
the "extracurricular activity fund".
(1) There shall be deposited in the extracurricular activity fund:
- 3 - 00388005
(A) All funds produced from the fines ordered pursuant to
this section; and
(B) Appropriations made by the general assembly to the
extracurricular activity fund.
(2) In addition to the funds deposited pursuant to subdivision
(d)(1), the commissioner of education may accept other funds, public or
private, by way of gift or grant to the fund.
(3) Moneys in the extracurricular activity fund may be invested by
the state treasurer in accordance with the provisions of § 9-4-603.
(4) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, interest
accruing on investments and deposits of the extracurricular activity fund
shall be credited to such fund, shall not revert to the general fund, and
shall be carried forward into the subsequent fiscal year.
(5) Any balance remaining unexpended at the end of a fiscal year
in the extracurricular activity fund shall not revert to the general fund but
shall be carried forward into the subsequent fiscal year.
(6) Money in the extracurricular activity fund shall be earmarked
for distribution to local education agencies in the proportion that each
local education agency's student population has to the overall statewide
student population of all local education agencies to be used as follows:
(A) For musical instruments for band, fifty percent (50%);
(B) For books, twenty-five percent (25%); and
(C) For sports equipment for school sponsored athletics,
twenty-five percent (25%).
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(7) Money in the extracurricular activity fund may be expended
only in accordance with annual appropriations approved by the general

SECTION 2. This act shall take effect July 1, 2009, the public welfare requiring it.

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